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Abstract  I make two related proposals, one about directed scale segments and 
the other about the nature of degrees.  Bale (2007, 2011) argued that degrees 
should be analyzed as sets of individuals and that degree arguments are created in 
the syntax from relational predicates.  Schwarz (2010) showed that Bale’s 
construction runs into problems when the relational predicate is complex, 
consisting of an LF constituent that contains more than just a gradable adjective.  
I modify Bale’s proposal so that it overcomes Schwarz’s objection.  But first I 
propose a semantics for comparatives based on quantification over directed scale 
segments, triples consisting of two degrees and a measure function. The 
modification of Bale’s proposal depends upon this.  Segments are of independent 
interest as they permit a conjunctive semantics for extended adjectival phrases, 
the way events do for verb phrases.  Potential benefits of ‘degree-conjunctivism’ 
are explored.  
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1  Introduction 
It is often said that a gradable predicate such as tall has a degree argument and 
that constructions such as the comparative or the equative rely on quantification 
over degrees.  I want to consider alternatives to both of these ideas.  Section 3 is 
devoted to the idea that gradable predicates denote relations between possible 
individuals, an idea discussed in Cresswell 1976 and elsewhere (Hoeksema 1983; 
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Klein 1991; Rullmann 1995: §2.10), most recently in Bale 2011.  I summarize 
Bale’s proposals and then offer a modification of his approach that addresses a 
challenge raised in Schwarz 2010.   The modification has to do with how degrees 
are constructed from relations between individuals.  The empirical foci of Bale’s 
proposals are comparatives that include for phrases (taller for a man) and 
comparatives based on conjunctions (more interesting and dangerous).  Section 2 
is devoted to the idea that degree constructions rely on quantification over 
segments of a scale.  For example, in a comparative, instead of selecting a degree, 
d, and quantifying over all degrees d that exceed it, we quantify over segments of 
a scale that begin with some d and end with a higher d.  This move allows for a 
conjunctive semantics, in which each part of a comparison (standard, target, 
greater-than relation) is encoded in its own conjunct.  One motivation for this is a 
comparative construction in Navajo paraphrased by Young and Morgan as “She is 
pretty, being beyond me”, in which the semantics of comparison is all tucked 
inside a predicative PP, itself buried in an adjunct. A conjunctive semantics also 
permits an analysis of de-re degree readings of than-phrases (Napoli 1983; 
Heim 1985; Lechner 2008) using standard tools but without appeal to ellipsis. 
The two ideas are logically independent, although both are employed in the 
solution to Schwarz’s challenge and in related examples.    
2  Directed scale segments  
In the comparative in (1) below, Tom is the target of comparison and Susan is  
the standard of comparison.   -er is a comparative marker and than is a standard 
marker.  I will call the phrase than Susan the standard phrase.  The standard 
phrase has the form of a PP and the entire sentence is a phrasal comparative.  This 
contrasts with a clausal comparative in which the standard marker governs a 
clause (eg Tom is taller than you think he is).   
(1) Tom is taller than Susan. 
The formula in (2) below is intended to capture the meaning of (1). Taking TALL 
to denote the relation that holds between an individual and his height, (2) says that 
Tom’s height exceeds Susan’s height.   
(2) dt ds  TALL(t, dt)  TALL(s, ds)   dt  >  ds     
In his commentary on von Stechow 1984, M. J. Cresswell wrote “von Stechow 
assumes that it is meaningful to say things like d1 > d2, without saying where > 
comes from.  In particular the question of whether > is an ordering of all degrees, 
and what kind of an ordering it is, does not seem to me to be really faced.”  In his 
own 1976 paper, Cresswell dealt with this issue by taking a degree to be a pair 
consisting of an ordering and what I will temporarily call a ‘measurement’.  
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Cresswell would define dt and ds as in (3) below.  ut is a measurement, what you 
ascertain when you measure Tom’s height, and  >HT is the standard ordering of 
heights.  In (4), the last conjunct of (2) is spelled out making reference to the 
coordinates of Cresswellian degrees.       
(3) dt = ut,  >HT  ,  ds = us ,  >HT    
(4) dt  >  ds    if and only if    ut  >HT us 
In this paper, I want to explore the consequences of expanding these pairs by 
adding a measure function, μ, and a second measurement.  I want the resulting 
tuples to pick out segments of a scale and so I restrict them in the following way.  
The two measurements must be in the set of measurements assigned by the 
measure function and the ordering must be an ordering of that set.  Using σ as a 
variable over these ordered four-tuples, we can write:   
(5) σ =  u,   v,   >,   μ 
I want to think of the first measurement as the start of the segment and the second 
as the end.  Referring to the segment defined in (5), I introduce special predicates 
that pick out the first and second coordinates of a scale segment: 
(6) START(σ) = u  END(σ) = v 
A segment that starts with, say, 5ft and ends with 6ft is a rising segment.   In (7), I 
introduce a special predicate symbol, , to say that a segment is rising.  In the 
definition,  >σ refers to the ordering that is the third coordinate of σ and similarly, 
μσ will be used to refer to the last coordinate of σ. 
(7) (σ)    END(σ) >σ START(σ)   
The technical term for a line segment that has a designated start and a designated 
end is “directed” and so I call my tuples directed scale segments.  And I will take 
the domain of type d to consist of directed scale segments, where, following 
Hellan 1981 and much recent work, type d is the semantic counterpart of the 
syntactic label Degree.   
We can now give a segmental rendering of the meaning of (1).   
(8) σ  (σ)  START(σ) = μσ(s)   END(σ) = μσ(t)   μσ = HT 
(9) ‘There is a rising directed scale segment: it starts with Susan’s measurement 
on the scale, it ends with Tom’s measurement on the scale, and it is a 
segment of the height scale.’  
Since we are not adopting Cresswell’s idea in (3), the term ‘degree’ is freed up, 
and I’d like to use it instead of the term ‘measurement’.  This might cause 
temporary confusion, but it will facilitate comparison with previous work.  So the 
first two coordinates of a segment are degrees, and (9) should be rephrased as: 
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(10)  ‘There is a rising directed scale segment: it starts with Susan’s degree on 
the scale, it ends with Tom’s degree on the scale, and it is a segment of the 
height scale.’ 
A potential advantage of a segmental semantics lies in the kinds of meanings 
it allows us to assign to the parts of the comparative clause.  To illustrate this 
potential, let’s consider a possible compositional semantics for (1).   The structure 
in (11) below is inspired by the idea that the formula in (8) looks like a 
Davidsonian event semantic meaning with the segment playing the role of an 
event variable.  The structure is meant to capture the stage before the subject 
moves to Spec,TP.  Below T, I’ve assumed existential closure of the type d 
variable, following Rett 2008.  I’ve adopted the idea of an extended AP headed by 
Deg° (see Matushansky 2013 and references therein), with the individual subject 
of the adjective introduced by a “little deg” (Bhatt and Pancheva use little a).  I 
treat End and Start like thematic role names.  End is severed from the adjective 
like eventive Agent (Kratzer 1996) and Start is notionally like a Source role.  
 
(11) Provisional Syntax and Semantics for phrasal comparative 
 
“er‘ =  λσ. (σ) 
“tall‘ =  λσ.  µσ = HT 
“than‘ = λx. λσ. (START(σ) = μσ(x)) 
“DegP‘ = λσ. (σ)  (µσ = HT)  START(σ) = μσ (s) 
“End‘ = λΣ. λx. λσ. (END(σ) = μσ (x)  Σ(σ)) 
“deg‘ = λx λσ. (END(σ) = μσ (x))  (σ)  (µσ = HT)  (START(σ) = μσ (s)) 
“degP‘ =  λσ. (END(σ) = μσ (t))   (σ)  (µσ = HT)  (START(σ) = μσ (s)) 
 
The information concerning the kind of scale being described gets introduced 
with the adjective, but gets passed up and is still present at the degP level.  It is 
Schwarzschild 
 216 
encoded in the segments.  We’ll see that this has favorable consequences for 
dealing with the properties of comparatives containing for phrases, discussed in 
Bale 2011.  Turning to standard phrases, on the proposed semantics they have two 
important properties.  Like Davidsonian event adverbs, they are one-place 
predicates and they combine conjunctively.  So as far as the semantics is 
concerned, they are free to combine at any point below the existential closure.  
Another feature of standard phrases in this setup is that their meaning encodes a 
measurement of the standard and only of the standard.  The two degrees, that of 
the target and that of the standard, are described in separate expressions.   In the 
next two subsections I present analyses of empirical phenomena that capitalize on 
these features. 
2.1 Subordinated Standard Phrases (Bogal-Allbritten 2013) 
Bogal-Allbritten 2013 offers a detailed analysis of a comparative construction in 
Navajo in which the standard phrase is subordinated relative to the rest of the 
clause.  One of her examples is repeated in (12) below, with the standard phrase 
within square brackets: 
(12) Shideezhí             [ shi-lááh             ’át’ée = go ]        nizhóní. 
          my.little.sister       1SG.OBJ-beyond   3SUBJ.be =SUB    3SUBJ.pretty.AA 
          ‘My little sister is prettier than me.’ 
The bracketed phrase is headed by the clitic =go which is also used to mark 
expressions with when-clause and if-clause interpretations (Schauber 1979).  This 
clitic is sometimes referred to as an adverbializer.  Bogal-Allbritten also offers 
syntactic evidence that the bracketed expression is a modifying adverbial.  Unlike 
arguments, the bracketed expression can be moved to the left of the subject.  And 
the bracketed phrase can be omitted altogether preserving grammaticality.  The 
result is glossed as ‘my little sister is pretty’. 
 ’át’ée is a copula and shi-lááh is a postpositional phrase that can be used to 
mean ‘beyond me’ in the spatial sense.  I will assume here that the PP is type 
d,t which means we have a predicational copula,1 type d,t,d,t.  Young 
and Morgan (1987) use paraphrase to give a sense of the meaning of comparatives 
like those in (12).  Their paraphrase for (12) would be “My little sister is pretty, 
being beyond me” which nicely captures both the predicative nature of the 
bracketed phrase and its adjunct status.  There is one more fact about (12) that 
will inform our analysis.  The postposition -lááh clearly introduces the standard of 
                                                 
1 If we were to assume that PPs are quantificational, then the copula could be taken to include a 
type shift.  See Schwarzschild 2012 for discussion of this point and its relevance to other kinds of 
comparatives in Navajo. 
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comparison, but it also marks the clause as a comparative of superiority.  
Replacing -lááh ‘beyond’ with =gi ‘at’ leads to an equative meaning, as Bogal-
Allbritten shows, and replacement with -’oh produces a less-than comparative. 
Thinking segmentally, -lááh lexicalizes both  and START predications.  The 
standard phrase has the meaning in (13) below: 
(13)  “shi-lááh  ’át’ée=go‘ =   λσ.  (σ)  START(σ) = μσ (me) 
Assuming something along the lines of our tree above in (11) minus the 
comparative marker, we get the meaning in (14) which reduces to (15).   
(14) σ  (END(σ) = μσ(sistr))   μσ = BEAUTY    
[λσ. (σ)  START(σ) = μσ' (me)](σ) 
(15) σ  (END(σ) = μσ(sistr))   μσ = BEAUTY   (σ)  START(σ) = μσ(me) 
If the standard phrase is omitted from (12), the interpretation we get is the top part 
of (14), which only says that my sister has some measure of beauty.  Evaluativity 
may need to be added via a Rettian EVAL predicate or by restricting the domain of 
existential closure (see Bogal-Allbritten 2013 and Schwarzschild 2012 for 
discussion). 
On the just proposed analysis, -lááh is able to encode both  and START in an 
independent, subordinated modifier because our domain of quantification consists 
of segments and a segment is capable of possessing a start point and of having an 
orientation.  The identity of the measurement function on which  is defined need 
not be revealed in the adjunct, because it is described in the main predication and 
the information is carried along in the segment.  Apparently, languages can 
choose to apportion these pieces of information in the opposite way with  and 
START in the main predication and the measure function in the modifier, as in 
Andersen’s 1982: 233 (1) example of a ‘verbal construction’: 
(16) John surpasses his friends in skill. 
In (16), the main verb encodes  and the roles END and START are associated 
with subject and object positions.  The identity of the measure function follows in 
the modifier.2 
According to what we claimed here in (13), and in the previous section in 
(11), Navajo -lááh encodes  but English than does not.  The claim about English 
isn’t completely true to the facts, for even if  is encoded in -er, the presence of 
than is a sign that a rising segment is being described.3  We can capture this state 
                                                 
2 I’m grateful to Philippe Schlenker for pointing out the relevance of a segment analysis to ‘exceed 
comparatives’, to use Stassen’s (1985) term. 
3 Let’s assume that less is a spellout of little + -er (Bobaljik 2012 §7.2; Heim 2008 and references 
therein). 
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of affairs by adding a presupposition (enclosed between a colon and a dot) to the 
meaning of than as in (17) or (18).  
(17) “than‘ =   λx. λσ: (σ). START(σ) = μσ(x)   
(18) “than‘ =  λx. λΣ: σ (σ ∈ Σ  (σ)).   λσ. START(σ) = μσ(x)  Σ(σ) 
With (18), function application is used to interpret the merging of the standard 
phrase with the rest of the clause.  The motivation for (18) is that we may want to 
treat equative as as describing segments that are either rising or flat.   In that case, 
with (17) we run the risk of allowing *as tall than, depending on how 
presupposition projection works in intersective modification structures.  On the 
other hand, this potential disadvantage of (17) for English would be an advantage 
for languages in which the standard marker for equatives and comparatives is the 
same (Andersen 1982: 236, von Stechow 1984: 8).  The presuppositional proposal 
in (17)/(18) might be a good alternative to the somewhat problematic approaches 
to the -er~than dependency in terms of selection or agreement (Alrenga, 
Kennedy, and Merchant 2012: 39, Bhatt and Pancheva 2004: 3-4, Grosu and 
Horvath 2006: 459).  This proposal also offers a different perspective on the point 
of attachment of than clauses relative to the position of -er, an issue discussed at 
length in the above referenced works.  Assuming (18), in order to satisfy the 
presupposition, than phrases must be merged after -er, and for type-reasons, they 
must be merged before existential closure. 
In this subsection, we looked at free-adjunct standard-phrases in Navajo, the 
-er~than dependency and exceed comparatives.  In each case, I’ve highlighted the 
potential advantages of a semantics that runs on segments, but without seriously 
comparing it with the alternatives.  For the Navajo data, Bogal-Allbritten 
addresses the lack of a measure function description in the standard phrase by 
appeal to ellipsis.  In Navajo, there is a kind of subcomparative in which the 
object of the postposition is a nominalized clause.  Based on this, Bogal-Allbritten 
posits an underlying clause inside the adjunct in (12) above.  In that case, the 
second, elided, occurrence of the adjective (re)identifies the measure function.  
Ellipsis will figure in a similar way in the following section on de-re readings. 
2.2  De-re standard phrases 
In the proposed theory, the degree of the standard is encoded in its own predicate, 
the standard phrase, to the exclusion of the degree of the target of comparison.  
This means that if a comparative is found in an intensional context and the 
standard phrase is read de-re while the rest of the comparative is read de-dicto, 
we’ll in effect be comparing degrees reached in different possible worlds.  To see 
what this looks like, consider the counterfactual in (19) below:  
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(19) If they had hired Holly, at least she would have been nicer to the staff than 
the current manager.   
(19) compares how nice Holly would have been to how nice the current manager 
actually is.  The modal statement below also has a salient de-re reading of the 
standard phrase:  
(20) According to the code, the new bench has to be wider than that old bench 
over there.  
(20) would be felicitous in a context where the production of a new bench is being 
discussed and where the speaker wants to use a nearby object to pick out a width.  
Crucially, the code in question makes no reference to the relative widths of the 
benches: if a too narrow new bench is produced, shortening the old one won’t 
help.  (20) compares how wide the new bench is in code-sanctioned worlds to 
how wide the old bench is in the actual world.  
In both (19) and (20), the DP object of than is read de-re, but that is not 
sufficient to produce the interpretation we’re after.  As Heim (1985: §3.4) 
observes, the degree-predication itself needs to be transparent.  To capture this 
reading in (20), we’ll need a meaning for wide and we’ll need to update some of 
the meanings given in (11) above (I’m ignoring the presupposition of than 
introduced in (17)-(18)). 
(21) “wide‘ =  λσ. µσ = WIDTH 
(22) WIDTH is a function whose domain includes all and only pairs of a world w 
and an object x in w that has a width.  
For any x,w in its domain, WIDTH(w)(x) is x’s width in w.  
(23) “than‘ = λw λx λσ. (START(σ) = μσ(w)(x)) 
(24) “End‘ = λw λΣ λx λσ. (END(σ) = μσ(w)(x)  Σ(σ)) 
And now assuming a syntax as in (11) above, we can capture the intended 
interpretation of (20) in a semantics with object level world variables as follows:4 
(25) hasw  λw (to-be σ  the new-benchw'  Endw'  wider   thanw the old-benchw) 
(26) w (ACC(w,w)   σ (END(σ) = μσ(new)(w))   (σ)  (µσ = WIDTH)  
(START(σ) = μσ(w)(old))) 
In (25), the standard phrase is a predicate that is read relative to a different world 
of evaluation than its neighbors. Predicates can also display temporal 
independence from their neighbors (Cooper 1978: 153; Enç 1986; Musan 1999; 
                                                 
4 In the SALT talk, I treated this example in terms of Schwager’s (2011) analysis of ‘Reading 3’ 
which is based on Cresswell and von Stechow’s higher order de-re.   I took the reported property 
to be the property of being a width segment that starts with the width of the old bench.  
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Kusumoto 2005; Tonhauser 2007a,b; Keshet 2010) and standard phrases are no 
exception.  As McConnell-Ginet (1973: 159-160) observed, (27) below is 
naturally read as comparing our heights, measured now, to our ancestors’ heights, 
measured in the past.  
(27) We are taller than our ancestors. 
Just as standard-phrase PPs have transparent readings, so do temporal and spatial 
PPs, as in the following examples:  
(28) The midterm exam has λw to take place beforew our next potluck, 
according to University rules.  
(29) You see Beal over there, standing against the wall?  The painting needs 
λwto be about 3 inches abovew his head. 
(28) locates the exam relative to the time of the potluck, but of course University 
rules don’t refer to potluck time, and a postponement of the potluck will not allow 
for a later midterm.  In (29), the location of the painting in the need fulfilling 
world-times is coordinated with the location of Beal’s head in the actual world at 
the moment of speech. 
The analysis in (25) relies on the fact that the meaning of standard marking 
than includes the application of a measure function.  As in the previous 
subsection, there is an alternative analysis that relies on ellipsis.  Lechner 
(2008: §7.2.2) maintains that phrasal comparatives in English result from ellipsis 
in a clausal complement and he attributes de-re readings of standard phrases to 
contra-world-indexing the elided material and its antecedent.  On this account, the 
source for (20) above could be: 
(30) The new bench hasw  λw to be widerw' than that old bench is widew.  
If we ignore Heim’s (1985: §3.4) suggestion that contra-indexing blocks ellipsis, 
then (30) presents a real alternative to the segmental analysis, for English.  
However, Bhatt and Takahashi argue that standard phrases in Hindi are never 
underlyingly clausal and the Hindi example below (Veneeta Dayal, pc) has a de-
re readable standard phrase, just like (20):  
(31)  naye bench-ko       is bench-se    aaTh inch    cauRaa     honaa    caahiye 
           new  bench-DAT   this bench-SE  8                  wide        to-be      should 
          ‘The new bench has to be 8 inches wider than this bench’ 
It remains to be seen how the segmental analysis or the ellipsis analysis could 
explain the contrasts below, (32) from Heim 1985 and (33) from McConnell-
Ginet 1973.  In both cases the phrasal comparative in (a) lacks a sensible, de-re 
reading, present in its clausal counterpart in (b).  
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(32) a.  If your sister hadn’t been born, they would have spoiled you even more 
than her.  
    b. If your sister hadn’t been born, they would have spoiled you even more 
than they spoiled her. 
(33) a. Sydney is taller than Plato.  
    b. Sydney is taller than Plato was.  
In this subsection, we’ve covered so-called de-re degree readings of phrasal 
comparatives.   These readings are predicted by the segmental analysis sketched 
in (11) in conjunction with standard analyses of de-re read predicates.5  But again, 
at least in some cases, there are clausal ellipsis alternatives.  And even within non-
ellipsis accounts, it is possible to encode measurement in the meaning of than 
without having a conjunctive, segmental, semantics.6  Faller (2000) and following 
her Winter (2005) offer analyses along these lines.  One problem that Faller 
acknowledges (footnote 8) and that carries over to the present account has to do 
with “complicated sentences” like the producer wants the film to be more violent 
than the director.  As pointed out by a reviewer, Faller’s analysis cannot capture a 
reading of that sentence where the than-phrase is synonymous with than the 
director wants it to be.  This issue will be addressed in section 3.7  
3 Constructing degrees 
In this section we’ll be working towards a framework in which degrees are not 
primitive, but rather are defined in terms of sets of possible individuals. 
Subsection 1 gives background and motivation.  Subsection 2 offers a proposal 
for defining degrees and then using them to create directed scale segments.  
Subsection 3 returns to the issues raised in subsection 1.   
3.1 Bale, Kennedy & Schwarz 
In the example in (34), we have a conjunction of adjectives under a comparative 
marker.   
(34) The rattlesnake is more aggressive and poisonous than the copperhead.  
                                                 
5 The implementation in (25) does however violate Keshet’s 2010: 388 Intersective Predicate 
Generalization which bans contra-world-indexing of “two predicates interpreted intersectively”. 
6 Yet another possibility is double world indexing of -er, along the lines of the treatment of too in 
Nissenbaum and Schwarz 2008: §5.3. 
7 Some years ago, I tried a degree analysis with standard phrases that worked like Faller’s.  I am 
grateful to Irene Heim for making clear to me then the problem posed by these complicated 
sentences.    I tried a somewhat ad hoc solution at SALT 22. 
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Bale (2007) observed that examples of this type are problematic if one holds that 
(a) gradable adjectives have degree arguments, distinct ones for different kinds of 
scales, and (b) predicate conjunction is interpreted as generalized intersection.  If 
degrees of aggression are different from degrees of toxicity, the intersection will 
be empty.  Bale proposed to solve this problem by introducing degree arguments 
with the degree morphology.  Here’s a rough idea of how that works.  We start 
with an e,e,t meaning like in (35):  
(35) “aggressive‘ = λx. λy.  x is at least as aggressive as y  
Using this meaning we define metalanguage relations equally aggressive and 
more aggressive than. 
(36) x is equally as aggressive as y  iff  
 “aggressive‘(x)(y) = 1 & “aggressive‘(y)(x) = 1 
 
(37) x is more aggressive than y  iff  
“aggressive‘(x)(y) = 1 & “aggressive‘(y)(x) = 0  
Now we can identify x’s degree of aggression with the set of individuals who are 
equally as aggressive as x.  This set is called x’s equivalence class.  Next we 
define a relation that orders degrees of aggression: d1 > d2 just in case any 
individual in the class/degree d1 is more aggressive than any individual in the 
class/degree d2.  Finally, we define an individual-degree relation:   λx λd.  x  d.  
Further details can be found in Bale 2007, 2011.  The crucial point here is that the 
meaning in (35) relates individuals and so the conjunction in (34) can happen 
before degrees are introduced.  And then when more is added in (34), a degree 
relation is created starting with the e,e,t meaning of aggressive and 
poisonous. 8  
In Bale 2011 we find a different kind of argument for constructing degrees out 
of individual relations.  The argument is based on examples like (38) below: 
(38) Esme is taller for a woman than Seymour is for a man. 
Bale’s reasoning begins with Kennedy (2007) who argued that for phrases are 
domain restrictors on functions denoted by gradable predicates.  tall for a man  
denotes a function that is defined only for men.  As Kennedy argues, the 
impression that for phrases pick out comparison classes results from the fact that a 
norm for comparison is calculated on the restricted function.  When we inspect 
the range of possible heights assigned, to arrive at a standard, we only look at 
heights of men because only they are assigned heights by this function.  But if a 
for phrase merely restricts a degree function, as Kennedy has it, we predict (38) 
                                                 
8 Faller (1999: 168) foresees exactly this type of solution to the conjunction problem.  
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above to be synonymous with (39), assuming Esme is woman and Seymour is a 
man: 
(39) Esme is taller than Seymour is. 
In fact, (38) and (39) are not synonymous.  It could be that (38) is true and (39) is 
false.  (38) induces what Bale calls ‘indirect comparison’ which “involves 
comparing the relative position of Esme in an ordering of women based on height 
to the relative position of Seymour in an ordering of men based on height.”  This 
is the same kind of interpretation that he observes in (40).  
(40) Marie Curie is more intelligent than Marilyn Monroe is beautiful.  
Here the relative position on an intelligence scale is compared with the relative 
position on a beauty scale.  The indirect interpretation is triggered in (40) by the 
fact that we compare different kinds of degrees.  Likewise, Bale takes the 
presence of indirect comparison in (38) to be evidence that the degrees satisfying 
tall for a woman and tall for a man are distinct.  He derives this result by allowing 
the for phrases to restrict type e,e,t expressions giving us meanings like in 
(41)-(42): 
(41) “tall for a woman‘ =  
λx: x is a woman.  λy: y is a woman.  x is at least as tall as y.  
(42) “tall for a man‘ =  
λx: x is a man.  λy: y is a man.  x is at least as tall as y. 
Degrees are constructed from (41) and (42).  But now the equivalence classes will 
be different – consisting entirely of women in the one case and entirely of men in 
the other (recall (36)).  Since these equivalence classes are the degrees, we end up 
with distinct degrees as in (40). 
Schwarz (2011) points out that Bale’s construction works well when the for 
phrase modifies an adjective, but it breaks down in more complex cases.  Schwarz 
argues that in (43), 
(43) Mia has an expensive hat [for a 3-year old]. 
the for phrase restricts a derived degree function, one that is denoted by a 
constituent formed at LF.  The restricted function assigns to a 3 year old the price 
of the hat they have: 
(44) λx: x is 3 yrs old.   λd.  x has a d-expensive hat. 
There are two facts about (43) that implicate the meaning in (44).   First, it is Mia 
who is presupposed to be a 3 year old, not the understood subject of expensive, 
which is a hat.  Secondly, the norm of comparison is the expected price of a hat 
that a 3 year old might have.  That’s because we consider the range of values, hat 
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prices, that the degree function in (44) assigns to elements in its domain, 3 year 
olds.  But now consider what would happen if we tried to arrive at (44) on Bale’s 
approach.  We’d presumably form degrees starting with the type e,e,t 
function in (45): 
(45) λx: x is 3yrs old.  λy: y is 3yrs old. x has a hat that is at least as expensive as y.  
By the construction in (35)-(36) above, if Tom is in the same equivalence class as 
Mia, then it has to be that “(45)‘(mia)(tom) = “(45)‘(tom)(mia) = 1.  But 
“(45)‘(tom)(mia) = 1 says that Tom has a hat that is as expensive as Mia is.  In 
general, assuming Mia does not have a price, there will be no equivalence class, 
hence no degree, to pair her with.   More technically, Bale’s construction relies on 
adjectives denoting relations that are reflexive, but reflexivity is not guaranteed 
for the meanings of complex constituents containing adjectives.   
As Schwarz shows, this particular example, (43), could be handled by the 
original Kennedy method where a for phrase restricts a measure function, one that 
is denoted by a constituent formed at LF.  But if we give up on Bale, we lose our 
explanation for the Esme-Seymour example, (38).  And, Schwarz argues, it will 
not do to limit Bale’s method to simple cases, since for induced indirect 
interpretations arise with derived degree functions as well:  
(46) Mia has a more expensive hat [for a 3-year old] than Sam does [for a 9-year 
old]. 
My aim in the remainder of this section is to address Schwarz’s objection by 
modifying Bale’s construction of degree predicates. 
3.2  Constructing degrees and directed scale segments 
Bale’s construction of degrees follows Cresswell, who was worried about “the 
metaphysical reality of degrees of comparison”.   As we have just seen, the 
Achilles heel of this construction is reflexivity, so the plan is to modify the 
construction in some way that avoids it.   In building up to his proposal, Cresswell 
(1976: 281) writes: “We take as basic data that we can and do make comparisons, 
i.e., that comparative sentences can be true or false; further, that we have the 
ability to make counterfactual comparisons. That is to say, our competence in this 
area is not limited to judgments involving how things actually are but can 
encompass judgments about how things might be. This means that we can make 
other-world and even trans-world comparisons.”  With this idea in mind, I 
propose that we take gradable adjectives to relate possible individuals.  Following 
Cresswell, I’ll represent a possible entity with a pair of a thing and a world.   
Ignoring the presupposition of heightedness, the meaning of tall comes out as: 
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(47) “tall‘  =  λw. λx. λy,w.  x’s height in w meets or exceeds y’s height in w.  
Blurring the distinction between sets and their characteristic functions, according 
to (47), when applied to a world w and an entity x, “tall‘ assigns x a set of possible 
individuals that are equally tall or less tall than x in w.  I propose that we identify 
these sets of possible individuals with degrees.  The motivating intuition is that 
when we name a person’s height, we aim to convey where x is situated in a height 
ordering relative to all other entities, real and imagined.   
Once we have degrees, we can proceed to the other elements of a directed 
scale segment, the ordering and the measure function.  If a set of possible 
individuals is a degree, then the meaning for tall in (47) just is a measure function 
(compare the definition of WIDTH given in (22)) and proper subset gives us what 
we need for an ordering:  
(48) For any degrees, u, v:  u < v  IFF u  v. 
Taking (47) to be a height-assigning measure function, according to (48), if all 
those possible individuals who are as tall or less tall than Jack are also as tall or 
less tall than Jill, but not vice-versa, then Jack’s height is lower than Jill’s.  Going 
back to Cresswell’s commentary on von Stechow 1984 cited at the beginning of 
section 2, on the current conception of degrees, the ordering in fact is an ordering 
of all degrees.  And now, since it is the same ordering no matter what, it no longer 
has to be specified in our segments.  
Here’s a summary of the revised segmental framework: 
 
(49) Segmental Semantic Framework (Revised)   
Degree the characteristic function of a set of entity-
world pairs   ( set of possible individuals) 
u,v 
Measure function a function that assigns a degree to an entity in 
a world 
µ 
Directed scale segment a 3-tuple whose third coordinate is a measure 
function and whose first two coordinates are 
degrees in the range of that measure function 
σ  
 
(50) Notation 
Let σ = u,v,µ be a directed scale segment, then:   
START(σ) = u,   END(σ) = v,     (σ)  START(σ) < END(σ) 
 
Schwarzschild 
 226 
The adjective meaning in (47) relates individuals, so at some point segments need 
to be introduced.  I follow Bale (2007) in including the introduction of d-type 
arguments in the meaning of the comparative marker.  I use the label es for the 
type of possible individuals. 
(51)  “-er‘ =   λ<s,<e,<es, t>>>. λσ .  (σ)   μσ =  
The main changes relative to previous sections are these: segments no longer 
include an ordering, degrees are analyzed in terms of possible individuals, 
adjectives denote measure functions (as in Kennedy 1997 and much subsequent 
work), and finally, the meaning of -er applies to a measure-function meaning and 
introduces segments.  The rest of the analysis in (11) can remain the same.   
Let us now look at some of the examples that motivated Bale’s construction of 
degrees in the syntax.  In the snake example, (34), the meaning of aggressive and 
poisonous can be gotten by intersecting the relations denoted by the two 
adjectives, giving us a new measure function that, when applied to a world w and 
an entity x, assigns a set containing any possible entity that is situated at or below 
x on the aggression ordering and at or below x on the toxicity ordering.  (34) says 
that the degree of the rattlesnake on this scale is greater than, that is, a proper 
superset of, that of the copperhead.  If, for example, the snakes are equally 
aggressive and equally toxic, then (34) is correctly predicted to be false, since in 
that case there are no possible individuals in the copperhead’s degree that aren’t 
also in the rattlesnake’s.9  
We turn now to Bale’s other argument for constructing degrees in the syntax:  
comparatives with for phrases in them.  Let’s assume with Bale that the for phrase 
is combined before -er, but that it only restricts the e-type argument, giving us the 
meaning in (52). 
(52) “tall for a woman‘  =   
λw. λx: x is a woman in w.  λy,w.  x’s height in w meets 
or exceeds y’s height in w.  
                                                 
9 This semantics predicts that (34) is true when the snakes are equally toxic but the rattlesnake is 
more aggressive.  A numerical illustration should make this clear.  Suppose the rattlesnake scores 
a 6 on the aggression scale and a 4 on the toxicity scale.  In that case, he scores a (6,4) on the 
aggression-toxicity scale.  And suppose the copperhead scores a (4,4) on that scale.  In that case, 
the copperhead’s degree will be a subset of the rattlesnake’s, and it will be a proper subset, 
because, for example, an entity that scores (5,3) is in the rattlesnake’s degree but not the 
copperhead’s.  I’m not sure what the intuitions are in this case.  It is possible that the sentence is 
infelicitous due to a homogeniety presupposition associated with the conjunction (see 
Gajewski 2005: §4-5, Szabolcsi and Haddican 2004, Malamud 2012 and references therein). I’m 
grateful to Galit Sassoon and Paul Portner for discussion of this issue.   
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Let’s further assume with Alrenga et al. that in clausal comparatives there is an 
instance of -er in the main clause and in the comparative clause.  In that case, we 
have the following meanings:  
(53) “taller for a woman‘  =  λσ.  (σ)   μσ =  
λw. λx: x is a woman in w.  λy,w.  x’s height 
in w meets or exceeds y’s height in w.  
(54) “taller for a man‘  =  λσ.  (σ)   μσ = 
λw. λx: x is a man in w.  λy,w.  x’s height in 
w meets or exceeds y’s height in w.  
The segments described in (53) and (54) do not have the same measure function.  
In other words, the d type arguments in the main clause and the comparative 
clause of (38) are different, just as they are in (40). In both cases the segments 
described in the main and subordinate clauses are based on different measure 
functions.  Suppose that the main and subordinate clause of (38) and (39) above 
are interpreted as in our original (11), but without the existential closure.  And 
then suppose the two clausal meanings are combined with the meaning in (55).   
(55) “thanclausal‘ = λΣ. λΣ: σ σ σ ∈ Σ  σ ∈ Σ  μσ=μσ'.  σ σ (σ ∈ Σ  
σ ∈ Σ  END(σ) =  START(σ))  
(39) will be felicitous and it will be true if Esme is taller than Seymour.  In that 
case, as (55) requires, there will be a rising segment σ that ends with Seymour’s 
height and a rising segment σ that ends with Esme’s height such that the start of 
σ is the end of σ.  (38), Esme is taller for a woman than Seymour is for a man, 
will suffer presupposition failure, as desired.  This sketch is not meant to be a 
serious analysis of clausal comparatives.10  My aim is to demonstrate that within a 
segmental semantics, it is possible to capture Bale’s essential idea: even though 
for phrases are merely domain-restrictors, their use affects the nature of 
constructed d-type arguments and thus only an indirect interpretation is possible 
in comparatives formed over for phrase restricted adjectives. 
Finally, we come to Schwarz’s example: 
(56) Mia has an expensive hat [for a 3-year old]. 
                                                 
10 See Beck 2012 for an analysis of a rich array of facts to do with modals and quantifiers in 
comparative clauses.  Although I have not said how to deal with those facts, it is worth noting that 
conjoined adjectives can be used to form clausal comparatives:  
(i) The rattlesnake is more aggressive and toxic than at least one of the copperheads was.  
This type of example helps to rule out a conjunction reduction source for adjectives conjoined 
under more.  (i) is not equivalent to: 
 (ii)  The rattlesnake is more aggressive than at least one of the copperheads was and is more 
toxic than at least one of the copperheads was.   
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Recall that a key feature of this example is that the restriction to 3 year olds 
applies to the subject of the main verb, so assuming Kennedy’s analysis of for 
phrases, Schwarz deduces the presence of a type d,e,t predicate formed at LF 
that includes the whole VP.  Schwarz attributes the creation of the derived 
predicate to LF movement of the operator POS, generated adjacent to the adjective.  
I will adapt Schwarz’s proposal to the current context.  To follow the derivational 
steps Schwarz assumes, we need to reorder the arguments of adjectives, as in (57).   
(57) “expensive‘  =  λw. λy,w.λx. x’s price in w meets or exceeds y’s price in 
w.  
This meaning still relates an individual and a world to a set of possible 
individuals, but since the type is changed, instead of saying that the measure 
function coordinate is equal to the meaning given by the gradable relation, we’ll 
have to say it is congruent to it: 
(58) μ  <s, <es, <e,t>>>        μ = λw.λx. λy,w.(w)(y,w)(x) 
The set of possible individuals assigned to any x in w by (57) is an indicator of 
where x is on an ordering based on monetary value and I will refer to such a set as 
‘a price’. 
In steps (59)-(61), the sentence is generated with POS adjacent to the adjective, 
the subject Mia is raised, creating a λ-abstract, and then POS raises to the edge of 
that newly created abstract.  This type of derivation is discussed in 
Barker 2007: §6 who called it ‘parasitic scope taking’.  It was exploited in 
Heim 1990 for phrasal comparatives and is now widespread (see 
Dotlačil 2010: 61 and references therein).  The world-binder λw is introduced in 
(62) because POS takes an intensional argument. 
(59) Mia has a POS expensive hat. 
(60) Mia λx x has a POS expensive hat. 
(61) Mia POS  λy,w λx x has a y,w-expensive hat. 
(62) Mia POS  λw λy,w λx x has a y,w-expensive hat. 
At this point, the adjunct for a 3 year old is merged countercyclically with the 
sister of POS:  
(63) Mia POS [[λw λy,w λx x has a y,wexpensive hat.] [for a 3 year old]]  
The meanings for the for phrase and for POS are in (64) and (65) and the resulting 
meaning for the sentence is in (66).  The world arguments in (66) originate from a 
world-indexed structure, as in section 2.2.  
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(64) “for a 3 year old‘ = λ.λw. λy,w. λx: x is 3 yrs old in w.  
(w)(y,w)(x) 
(65) “POS‘ = λ. λw. λx. σ (σ)  END(σ)= μσ(w)(x)  START(σ) = 
NORM(μσ)(w)  μσ   
(66) σ (σ)   END(σ) = μσ(w)(mia)   START(σ) = NORM(μσ)(w)  
μσ = λw. λx: x is 3 yrs old in w. λy,w. x has a hat whose price in w 
exceeds y’s price in w.  
μσ(w)(mia) is only defined if Mia is a 3 year old in w.  And the norm will be 
calculated on a function that only applies to 3 year olds and returns hat prices.  
(66) requires Mia’ hat price to be above the norm.  We have succeeded then in 
implementing Schwarz’s proposal in a Bale-friendly framework, where gradable 
adjectives denote relations between individuals. 
3.3  Phrasal comparatives: direct analysis 
In certain respects, the Schwarz-Bale interaction recapitulates an earlier one 
between Heim and Hoeksema.  Hoeksema (1983) associated adjectives with a 
‘primitive grading relation’ of type e,e,t.  His semantics for phrasal 
comparatives begins by using that relation to assign a meaning to the 
comparative form of the adjective.  Heim (1990) investigated the matter in detail 
and concluded “…that comparative morpheme affixation not only resists a lexical 
treatment, but [that] the comparative suffix must even be assumed to move in the 
derivation of Logical Form (LF) from S-Structure (SS).”  Heim 2001 covers a 
wealth of additional evidence for this view. Since Schwarz’s own analysis was 
informed by Heim’s discovery, it is no surprise that a derivation similar to (59)-
(61) above, can be used in (67) below, with more taking the place of POS.  
(67) Mia has a more expensive hat than Zelda. 
(68) Mia has a more expensive hat. 
(69) Mia λx x has a more expensive hat. 
(70) Mia more  λy,w λx x has a y,wexpensive hat. 
(71) Mia more  λw λy,w λx x has a y,wexpensive hat. 
(72) Mia [more  λw λy,w λx x has a y,wexpensive hat] [than Zelda]. 
(73) Mia END [more  λw λy,w λx x has a y,wexpensive hat] [than Zelda]. 
(74) σ Mia END [more  λw.λy,w.λx x has a y,wexpensive hat] [than 
Zelda]. 
To keep in sync with section 2, I continue to assume a meaning for more like in 
(51) in the previous subsection.  For this reason, I’ve inserted an End head in (73).  
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This means that Mia is assigned two thematic roles, one in the VP and one in the 
degP, making this a kind of control via movement structure (Boeckx and 
Hornstein 2004).11  An obvious alternative would be to complicate the meaning of 
more so that it introduces the target of comparison.  The meaning in (74), like 
(66), asserts the existence of a rising segment that ends with Mia’s hat-price, but 
this time the segment starts with Zelda’s hat-price.   
Assuming a similar kind of derivation via more movement in Schwarz’s (75) 
below, the segments described in the main and subordinate clauses will have 
different measure function coordinates, as in Bale’s original example (38).   
(75) Mia has a more expensive hat [for a 3-year old] than Sam does [for a 9-year 
old]. 
This completes our discussion of Schwarz’s challenge to Bale.  I’d like to return 
to (76) below in a wider context of degree semantics.  On the current proposal, the 
interpretation of (76) makes use of the measure function in (77): 
(76) Mia has a more expensive hat than Zelda. 
(77) λw. λx. λy,w. x has a y,w-expensive hat 
If Zelda has several hats, (77) will assign her the price of the most expensive 
one: the set of all possible entities whose price is less than a hat Zelda has.  This 
means that our semantics for (76) requires Mia to have some hat that is more 
expensive than any Zelda has.  An analysis of Heim’s which uses a maximality 
operator in the meaning of -er makes the same prediction, which Heim 1990: 40 
finds questionable (see also Sharvit and Stateva 2002: §6.2)  
The maximality operator was introduced into degree semantics by von 
Stechow (1984), who was motivated in part by examples with possibility modals 
in than-clauses.  von Stechow did not consider necessity modals.  Heim (2001) 
later showed that incorporating necessity modals in a system like von Stechow’s 
requires degree relations to be monotonic, in a sense to be defined shortly.  
                                                 
11 The control-as-movement description applies more aptly in a derivation with traceless 
movement instead of parasitic scope taking:  
 
(i) Mia has a more expensive hat. 
(ii) Mia λx x has a more expensive hat. 
(iii) more  λy,w Mia λx x has a y,w-expensive hat. 
(iv) more  λw λy,w Mia λx x has a y,w-expensive hat. 
(v) End [more  λw λy,w Mia λx x has a y,w-expensive hat] [than Zelda]. 
(vi) Mia End [more  λw λy,w λx x has a y,w-expensive hat] [than Zelda]. 
 
In step (iii-v), more raises and then a degP is projected with an [deg° End] head.  In step (vi), Mia 
raises tracelessly to Spec, degP. [than Zelda] could be merged before or after [deg° End]. 
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Beck (2011) provides a comprehensive overview of these and related issues.  In 
the remainder of this subsection, I want to briefly review Heim’s argument and 
then consider what happens in the current system when modals appear in phrasal 
comparatives. 
This paper began with the familiar idea that tall relates an individual to his 
height.  Various authors have argued instead that tall relates an individual to a set 
of heights, his actual height and all those below it.  As just noted, Heim (2001) 
provided a particularly compelling argument for this idea which, following 
Gawron (1995), she refers to as “the monotonicity property of adjective 
meanings”.12  The argument has to do with necessity modals and one can get a 
sense of it by considering traffic laws.  Such laws generally do not specify a 
particular speed at which one must travel; instead, a range of speeds is permitted.  
Nevertheless, we make comparisons in this domain:  You have to drive faster on a 
highway than on a city street.  An analysis like in (1)-(2) above will presumably 
quantify over speeds d that satisfy the open sentence one has to drive d-fast on a 
highway.  Without monotonicity, no speed will satisfy this sentence because there 
is no speed d such that you have to drive that speed on a highway.  This problem 
goes away when gradable predicates associate an individual with a set of degrees, 
monotonically defined. 
Under the segmental analysis described above, Jack can run faster than Jill 
can be interpreted in terms of the measure function in (78).   
(78) λw. λx. λy,w.  x canw run y,w-fast. 
That function will assign to Jack in any world w, the same degree as (79) below 
assigns to him in the w-accessible world where he runs the fastest, what might be 
called Jack’s ‘maximal degree’.    
(79) λw. λx. λy,w.  x runw y,w-fast. 
In other words, the effect of von Stechow’s maximality operator is captured 
already in the creation of a measure function.  Artstein (1998) pointed out that 
von Stechow’s maximality operator actually fails in a situation where there is no 
‘maximal degree’, say if Jack can run at any speed less than n mph (see also Fox 
and Hackl 2006 on this point).  (78) will assign Jack a degree even in this case. 
Turning to necessity modals, Jack has to run faster than Jill can be interpreted in 
terms of the measure function in (80).   
(80) λw. λx. λy,w.  x has-tow run y,w-fast. 
                                                 
12 This idea is occasionally made vivid by saying that if Jack is 5 feet tall, then he is also 4 feet tall 
and he’s also 3 feet tall and so on.  While this is not a necessary consequence, it does point to 
another locus of intuitive unease that comes with treating degrees as primitive.  See Schwarzschild 
2008 for an attempt to make sense of monotonicity in terms of the idea of a threshold. 
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That function will assign to Jack in any world w, the same degree as (79) assigns 
to him in the w-accessible world where he runs the slowest, what might be called 
Jack’s ‘minimal degree’ and this is as in Heim 2001.13   
It seems then that our particular choice for how to derive degrees from 
primitive grading relations has the benefit that it somehow encodes ‘maximality’ 
and ‘monotonicity’.  Although our measure functions are defined on possible 
individuals, the logic is the same as in a degree semantics with monotonicity 
(Rett 2006, 2008: §2; Heim 2006).  What should we make of this?  If one is 
persuaded that degrees should not be primitive entities in the semantics, then 
modals in comparatives represent an argument for the method for deriving them 
proposed in subsection 3.2.  And if one is happy with the intuitions behind that 
method, then we have an explanation for maximality and monotonicity.  They 
need not be stipulated in the meanings of adjectives and degree heads and they are 
not detachable – we expect to find these effects whenever degrees are invoked.  
3.4 More on degrees and segments 
In the previous two subsections, we defined degrees in terms of possible 
individuals, allowing us to handle conjunctions, as Bale (2007) suggested, and 
then, having done this in a segmental context, we were able to implement his idea 
about for phrases in a way that avoided the problems pointed out by Schwarz.  To 
conclude, I’d like to briefly discuss two examples that require the tools introduced 
in section 3 and that make a connection with the discussion in section 2.  
(81) below is a variation on the counterfactual example (19) used in 
subsection 2.2: 
(81) If they had hired Holly, she would have made tastier bread than the current 
chef.  
Like (19), the standard PP at the end of (81) is best read de-re.  (81) differs from  
(19) in that the measure function that assigns the current chef a degree in the 
actual world is denoted by an LF derived predicate.  It is that function that assigns 
to any x and w in its domain, the degree to which x makes tasty bread in w.  So the 
-er affix on tastier will need to move to take the whole complement of would in 
its scope.  But once that is done, the semantics is segmental, and so the standard 
phrase gets to ‘use’ that function.   
In section 2.2, we had de-re readings of counterfactuals and modal statements.  
I think such readings are possible as well in propositional attitude contexts.  See 
what you think of the following case. 
                                                 
13 I’m assuming that –er scopes over the modal in both of these examples.  To be sure, there are 
readings where the scope if reversed.   
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Suppose the U.S. Internal Revenue Service assessed a tax on us based on the 
size of our home and suppose they were wildly off, assuming our house to be 
much larger than it is.  Knowing that you are not versant in square footage, I mean 
to convey the enormity of their error by making reference to the Duke of York, 
whose home we looked at on a recent vacation in London.  I report: 
(82) The IRS thinks we own a larger house than the Duke of York.   
As far as I know, the IRS has no thought about the Duke of York, or his home, 
only the actual size of his home is part of the reported thought.  The standard 
phrase is read de-re and the measure function in play is one that assigns to an 
individual and a world, the size of the home they own in that world. 
4 Summary and Conclusion 
The empirical ground covered in this paper includes: adjective conjunctions under 
more, the dependency between -er and than, Navajo comparatives with free 
adjunct standard phrases, degree de-re standard phrases, comparatives containing 
for phrases and phrasal comparatives with modals.  The chief theoretical 
proposals were reduction of degrees to sets of possible individuals and the idea 
that Degree constructions involve quantification over directed scale segments.   
I’d like to end with a few remarks on these two proposals. 
A reductionist account of degrees removes mysteries that arise when degrees 
are primitive:  What are degrees?  Where do they come from?  What determines 
their ordering? Why does degree quantification into intensional contexts seem 
uncomplicated as compared to individual quantifying in? What prevents degrees 
of different kinds from being ordered? Regarding the last question, on the 
definition of < given in (48), if my weight were ordered below my height, it 
would follow that any possible individual whose weight was equal to mine would 
have to be my height or less.  In other words, it would be impossible for someone 
taller than me to have my weight. And the only way my height could be ordered 
below my weight is if it were impossible for someone heavier than me to have my 
height. It is these kinds of impossibilities that explain what prevents weights and 
heights from being ordered.  In the future, it may be interesting to consider the 
development of measurement systems (Díez 1997) and their role in natural 
language semantics (Sassoon 2010, van Rooij 2011) from the reductionist 
perspective described here.  
When I first read about Navajo comparatives in Bogal-Allbritten 2008, I was 
puzzled by how much of the meat of comparison could be sandwiched inside an 
adjunct.  I’d become accustomed to thinking of the standard and the comparative-
marker as central elements of the comparative.  In fact, differentials in English 
already show more flexibility than I was allowing for.  In Hellan 1981, specifier 
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differentials (5ft taller) are arguments of the comparative morpheme.  In 
Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 2002, it becomes even more important to include 
differential information in the semantics of the comparative morpheme.  And yet, 
differentials can appear inside adverbial PPs following the rest of the clause:   
(83) The bowl is heavier than any of the glasses were, by at least 2 grams. 
The segmental framework proposed in section 2 is an attempt to cope with the 
flexibility languages display in the arrangement of the parts of a comparative 
construction.  I should note an open question for structures considered here.  In 
section 3, -er was assigned the role of introducing segments.  What, if anything, 
performs this task in comparatives without comparative markers, like the Navajo 
example cited in section 2?  
The event-like character of the segmental framework leads naturally to the 
idea that there are thematic roles for segments.  Other proposals for extending the 
notion of thematic role to non-eventive relations include Larson 1991, 
Abney 1987: 294-5 and Schwarzschild 2006: §6.  I’m not sure if ultimately this is 
the right way to go.   
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